Explaining the success of the federal Liberals

After the April 28 general election, the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) is back in power for a fourth term after coming just short of a majority, winning 170 of the 343 seats in the House of Commons. Considering that the LPC trailed the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) by more than 20 points in the polls over the previous two years, its victory represented a remarkable political comeback.

This commentary is not a promotional blurb for the LPC, rather it seeks to identify the factors that enabled it to become one of the most successful parties in the democratic world. It is hard to identify another centrist party which has achieved such dominance and long-term success.

Over the 158 years of the country’s existence, the LPC has been in office for 97 years. In 26 of 45 general elections, it won the greatest share of the popular vote. It was so dominant during the 20th century that it was labelled the “government party.” Maintaining that dominance became more difficult in the first 25 years of the 21st century.

From 2006 to 2015, the LPC spent a decade in opposition, even falling to third place in the House of Commons after the 2011 election. As in the past, the party exhibited resilience bouncing back to majority status in the 2015 election under Justin Trudeau. Two minority victories followed in 2019 and 2021, elections in which the LPC actually received fewer votes than the CPC.

LPC success in the previous century owed much to Quebec. Voters in that province demonstrated uncanny solidarity in putting their support behind the winning party which most often was the LPC.

The vagaries of the first-past-the-post electoral system often helped the LPC to win more seats in Quebec and elsewhere than a more proportionate voting system would have given it. Often Quebec alone would put the Liberals halfway to a parliamentary majority.

The LPC has never been a highly ideological party. Someone once likened it to the United Church: it required membership, not necessarily faith. A broad, flexible ideological orientation meant it occupied, at various times, a wide space either slightly to the right or the left of the centre on the political spectrum.

At crucial junctures, it was quite prepared to “borrow” ideas from other parties to achieve success. Its instinct for spending money and applying restraint at the appropriate time was often politically, if not always economically, shrewd.

The LPC was better than Conservative parties in practising “brokerage politics” which involved bringing together under a “big tent” numerous types of ideological, social, regional, linguistic, multicultural, gender and racial diversities.

Like other parties, during the late 20th century the LPC became more leader-focused in its appeals to voters.

It demonstrated the knack for choosing leaders who made a strong emotional connection with voters, such as Pierre Trudeau in 1968, Justin Trudeau in 2013 and Mark Carney in 2025. Not all leadership choices, of course, matched the moment.

A focus on leadership helped with the LPC claim that it was the only party capable of ensuring national unity during times of regional and other types of tensions. Pan-Canadian representation in caucus and cabinet became more difficult to achieve in the past five decades, when political fragmentation created a multi-party system. Lacking balanced representation from across the country, often from the West, LPC governments improvised with senators in cabinet and regional desks in the office of the prime minister.

Organizational structures and processes contribute to success. The LPC has long relied on a decentralized organizational structure, linking its parliamentary caucus to its supporters on the ground, which allowed it to successfully respond to the country’s continually changing social and demographic realities.

Like other parties, partly to meet election law requirements, in the second half of the 20th century the LPC broke from its provincial wings. Organizational separation did not mean an end to political ties between the two tiers, so the national party could still draw upon the support of constituency associations and local campaigns across the country.

Money does not necessarily bring political success, but it is necessary to pay for essential activities on the national and local level. The LPC has not always led the fundraising parade.

In 2004, the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien introduced legislation to ban corporate and union donations, but partially made up for lost revenues by creating per-vote annual subsidies from the public purse to all parties. After Stephen Harper phased out the subsidies, the LPC moved to strengthen its fundraising capacity.

Troubles for its main opponent helped the LPC. According to George Perlin’s classic book “The Tory Syndrome,” the Conservative party has long been handicapped by an “opposition mentality.” It attracted disgruntled individuals, suffered from internal divisions, and changed leaders more frequently than the LPC.

After becoming leader in 2004, Harper shifted the party away from competing on brokerage basis and instead targeted party messaging more at core supporters, which may not be a long-term winning formula.

On April 28, the LPC captured 43.8 per cent of the national vote and won at least one seat in all provinces. History suggests it will not lose its competitive advantage any time soon.

» Paul G. Thomas is professor emeritus of political studies at the University of Manitoba. This column previously ran in the Winnipeg Free Press.